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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: TRANSACTIONS
IN AID OF EDUCATION
Part I
By
JOHN C. CHOMMIE**

Introduction
The purpose of this paper is primarily a survey of the impact of federal income taxation on some of the commonly reoccurring transactions in aid of education. Excluded are the problems involved in determining the exempt status of an
organization under section 101 of the Internal Revenue Code, and the problems
involved under section 162(a) permitting trusts and estates an unlimited charitable deduction.' However, as will be seen, the term "education" has the same
meaning in sections 101 (6) and 162 (a) as prevails in sections 23(0) and 23(q)
which will be discussed in the second installment. The paper also has a reformative
aspect: a suggestion for a revaluation of policies in the ineerests of tax equity and
long range general welfare.
The term "education" has a broad content. Of necessity, evaluation is dependent upon those transactions where there has been an expression of judicial,
legislative or administrative policy. The problems involved would seem to fall
under three major headings: (1) those involving the character of the receipt;
(2) those involving the character of the payment as a charitable (educational) deduction; and (3) those involving the character of the payment as a business expense.
PAT I.
THE RECEIPT: IS IT INCOME OR A GIFT?

Section 22 (a) of the Code expressly embraces compensation for strvices and
income from business and trade as two of the many income categories; section
22(b) (3) expressly excludes gifts. Also excluded by implication are capital receipts. Rarely, however, has this latter concept played an important part in this
area. More often than not the competing concepts involved in the transactions
characterized below are compensation for services and gift. This is true notwithstanding that generally the courts have interpreted section 22(a) as being but
illustrative of income categories, and not as containing an exclusive listing.
* [Editor's Note: Professor Chommie discusses the subject in three parts, of which this is the first.
The second installment, dealing with the problems involved in determining the character of a payment as a charitable (educational) deduction, will appear in the next issue of the DICKINSON
LAW REVIEW.]
* * Professor, Dickinson School of Law; B.S.L., LL.B., St. Paul College of Law; LL.M., University
ef Southern California; Member of the Bar of Minnesota.
1 For a comprehensive coverage of exempt organizations: 6 Mertens, Law of Federal Income
Taxation (Rev. Ed. 1949 Callaghan & Co.) §§ 34.01 to 34.53 incl., hereinafter referred to as Mertens; for discussion of the unlimited charitable deduction see: ibid., §§ 36.68 to 36.76 incl.
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It is elementary that the legal standard of the gift in section 22(b) (3) is
uie common law standard of donative intent, and that the burden is on the taxpdyer so to establish. 2 This makes each case largely an individual problem in
logic. Thus, in the categories listed below the broad approach is simply: has the
taxpayer established a donative intent on the part of the payor?
The Contest Prize
From an early date the Commissioner has taken the position that prizes and
3
awards received in commercial ventures constitute taxable income to the recipient.
With rare exceptions he has been able to maintain his position in the courts. His
only two losses have involved lotteries where the lottery winner performed neither
services nor gave other consideration as a participant. 4 On the other hand he has
won numerous sweepstakes 5 and essay contest cases. 6 Two of the latter deserve
attention here.
In Herbert Stein,7 the taxpayer, a government economist, won the first prize
in an essay contest sponsored by the Pabst Brewing Company. Although the subjcct matter of the contest, post-war employment, was hardly related to the payor's
business, the payor did exploit it in newspaper advertisements and treated its costs
as business expense. From such advertising and expense treatment the Tax Court
inferred a want of donative intent.
In Fredrick V. Waugh,8 the commercial aspect of the contest was much fainter. The essay contest was sponsored by the American Farm Economic Association,
a non-profit organization. The subject of the contest was farm price policies. The
taxpayer was another government economist. In finding taxable income the Tax
Court admitted that the payor neither sought nor derived pecuniary profit, but
inferred a want of donative intent from the fact that the purpose of the contest
seemed to be to create an interest in itself and in farm economics. It further pointed out that the payment in question was a gain to the taxpayer from his services.
Where the contest promotes a business interest of the payor the results have
been fairly consistent in finding a want of donative intent. On the other hand,
where the contest is conducted without a taint of commercialism, where the recipient has rendered a service from which the public as a whole benefits, and
where the payment for such services comes from an organization devoted to the
public welfare, a donative atmosphere is often created that makes a decision difficult.
2 See e.g. Mary G. Mulqueen, Ex., 25 B.T.A. 441, 446 (1932); Smith v. Manning, 189 F.2d
345 (C.A.3d 1951).
3 See e.g. I.T. 1651, 11-1 C.B. 54 (1923) (newspaper contest) ; I.T. 1667, 11-1 C.B. 83 (1923)
(lottery ticket given with each meal purchased) ; I.T.3987, 1950-1 C.B. 9 (radio contest).
4 Pauline C. Washburn, 5 T.C. 1333 (1945) (taxpayer's telephone number selected by chance
on a radio program); Bates v. Glenn, 114 F.Supp. 445 (D.C.W.D.Ky. 1953) (taxpayer's free
ticket winning automobile). Neither of these decisions is free of criticism. See e.g. Mintz, "Pot 0'
Gold in the Tax Court," 24 Taxes 940 (1946), criticizing the Washburn case.
6 Christian H. Droge, 35 B.T.A. 829 (1937) ; Harry J. Riebe, 41 B.T.A. 935 (1940), affirmed
per cur., 124 F.2d 399 (C.C.A.6th 1941) ; Max Silver, 42 B.T.A. 461 (1940).
6 Herbert Stein, 14 T.C. 494 (1950) ; Fredrick V. Waugh, 9 T.C.M. 309 (1950) ; United States
v. Amirikian, 197 F.2d 442 (C.A.4th 1952).
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.

FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

In McDermott v. Commissioner,9 the taxpayer, a law professor, won the
1939 Ross essay prize. The $3000 prize was paid by a trustee, the American Bar
Association, pursuant to a provision in the will of Erskine M. Ross, a former
federal judge. The subject matter of the contest was "To What Extent Should Decisions of Administrative Tribunals be Reviewable by the Courts?" The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia listed eight circumstances which "taken
together" required the conclusion that the award was a gift: (1) in "plain English the Association gave petitioner the prize;" (2) "the purpose of Judge Ross
and the American Bar Association ...was likewise to 'give' and to 'incite', not
to employ or buy"; (3) "money may be a gift ... although services are or have
been rendered by the donee"; (4) "the entire advantage accrued to the petitioner
and the community . . .distinguishes the Ross prize from puzzles, guessing contests . . . for commercial purposes"; (5) a characteristic of a gift is that it can
not be counted on in advance and may never recur; (6) the dominant motive of
such a contestant is "not a hope of immediate financial gain"; (7) a long continued administrative practice of not attempting to tax Nobel prizes, Guggenheim
fellowships, Rhodes scholarships and the like "is entitled to great weight"; and
(8) taxing such payments would discourage such scholarly work.
The Tenth Circuit refused to follow the McDermott case in United States v.
Robertson.10 In this case, the Detroit Orchestra, Inc. announced a contest for musical compositions written by native-born composers of North, Central and South
America. The announced purpose of the contest was to promote understanding
among the Pan-American nations. One of the conditions of the contest required
the transfer of certain rights to the payor by a winning contestant. The taxpayer's
submission, composed prior to the announcement of the contest, won the first
award of $25,000. In reversing the district court, the court of appeals relied on
the view, adopted by the Tax Court in the Stein case, that the payment was responsive to the taxpayer's services. It also stated that its decision was not bas-ed upon
the narrow ground that the relinquishment of the rights in the composition was a
consideration sufficient to determine the issue.
The conflict between the two circuits was resolved in favor of the Tenth Circuit view by the Supreme Court in Robertson v. United States.1 ' Mr. justice Douglas disposed of the issue in a short opinion:
"In the legal sense payment of a prize to a winner of a contest is the
discharge of a contractual obligation. The acceptance by the contestants
of the offer tendered by the sponsor of the contest creates an enforceable
contract... The discharge of legal obligations-the payment for services
rendered or consideration paid pursuant to a contract-is in no sense a
gift. The case would be different if an award were made in recognition of
past achievements or present abilities, or if payment was given not for
services ... but out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or like im9 150 F.2d 585 (C.A.D.C. 1945). The Internal Revenue Service expressly refused to follow the
decision, I.T. 3960, 1949-2 C.B. 13.
10 190 F.2d 680 (C.A.10th 1951).
11 343 U.S. 711, 72 S. Ct. 994 (1952).
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pulses. Where the payment is in return for services rendered, it is irrelevant that the donor derives no economic benefit from it."12
The Robertson decision perhaps renders the formal contest cases sui generis.
However, their development, cumulating in the Robertson decision, provides the
background for awards of a type more commonly associated with education.
The Scholarship Award
A scholarship may perhaps be defined as a stipend received by a deserving
student to enable him to pursue some additional formal training. As such, the
Service has ruled, "If a grant or fellowship is made for the training and education of an individual either as part of his program in acquiring a degree or in
otherwise furthering his educational development, no services being rendered as
consideration therefor, the amount of the grant is a gift which is excludable from
gross income." 1 The Rhodes Scholarship, mentioned in the McDermott opinion,
presumably falls within this rule.
Two types of scholarship awards, on which there is a dearth of authority, however, warrant some additional consideration. The first of these involves scholarships (and fellowships) awarded as a result of a formal competitive contest. In
one sense all formal training is competitive. However, a distinction between the
formal contest and the usual competition of the classroom is believed justified.
With the formal contest, adoption of the contract analogy of the Robertson case
would result in taxation. A variation on this fact pattern is the academic contest
conducted to incite scholarship. In many cases the recipient would escape taxation
because of the small amounts involved. The argument, however, in favor of taxability of the prize seems sound.
Where such contests are conducted by schools or other non-profit organizations, perhaps the courts would experience some difficulty in the application of
the Robertson rule. On the other hand, where sponsored by commercial firms, such
as the Fisher Body contests of some years back, exploited in advertising and treated as business expense, want of a donative intent should be easily established.
The second type of scholarship award presents a number of problems. This is
the award that is sometimes made to an employee or a child of an employee. More
often than not the courts have had little difficulty in finding that any benefit flowing from an employment relationship, regardless of how characterized, is compensation for services rather than a gift.14 In an early ruling the Internal Revenue
Service held that an employer's expenditures for books and tuition in connection
with the outside schooling of its employees should be included in the gross income
12 343 U.S. at 713-14, 72 S. Ct. at 996.

18 I.T.4056, 1951-2 C.B. 8. See also I.T.3702, 1944 C.B.74 (tuition and subsistence allowances to
veterans under Public Law 346, 58 Stat. 284, excludable); I.T.3756, 1945 C.B.64 (tuition and
maintenance to nurses and others in training under the Social Security Act held gifts); cf., Letter Ruling, Jan. 10, 1946, 1 P-H Tax Service,
7606 (stipends received by student nurses held
wages).
14 1 Mertens § 8.08.
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of the employees even though such schooling was required in order to retain their
jobs. 15 Perhaps this early ruling is not to be considered as conclusive. There does
seem to be a fine line drawn here between this outside schooling and on-the-job
training for a particular employment function. Further, under different circumstances, such as in case of a grant based on merit out of an employees trust and
treatment by the employer as a charitable contribution, a finding of a gift might
well be anticipated.
In the case of a scholarship awarded an employee's child, if it be considered
a benefit flowing to the employee-a constructive payment of compensation-the
same considerations as discussed above would apply. On the other hand, if it be
considered as income to the recipient, it might result in the loss of a dependency
exemption to the employee. As a gift, of course, it would not seem to affect either
the recipient or the employee.
The Research Fellowship
It can hardly be said that a "bright shining line" marks the division between
a scholarship and a fellowship. The terms are often used synonymously, and the
term "fellow" has a variety of meanings. One common type of an award is that
of the research fellowship. This may perhaps be defined as an award made to enable a graduate to do research work, to maintain himself and permit expenditures
for the necessary equipment, books, supplies and the like. In practice there is
hardly a common type of grantor. Schools, independent foundations, commercial
concerns, and individuals have all granted research fellowships. Further, as a matttr of practice, terms and conditions are commonly attached to the grant. These
terms and conditions and their execution, it would seem, would ordinarily be indicative of donative intent or the want thereof.
In I.T. 4056,16 a comprehensive ruling on four different grants made by a
private foundation upon application by the grantees, the Internal Revenue Service
has taken a position based upon thle direction of the payor's donative intent. Following the language set out above in connection with scholarships, the ruling states:
"However, when the recipient of a grant or fellowship applies his skill and training to advance rese-arch, creative work, or some other project or activity, the essential elements of a gift as contemplated by section 22 (b) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code are not present." Referring to the four awards: "to the extent there is
any donative intent present in the making of an award, it appears that the beneficiary is society at large and not the recipient of the award whose services are expected in return for the grant." What this seems to say is that the donor intends a
benefit (gift) to society and is paying compensation to the grantee of the award
to bring about this benefit. It should be pointed out that this ruling was issued after the decision of the Tenth Circuit in the Robertson case, but before the affirming
decision was handed down by the United States Supreme Court.
15 I.T.1304, I-1 C1. 72 (1922).
16 1951-2 C.B. 8, cited n. 13, supra.
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The court in the McDermott case pointed out a long continued administrative practice of not taxing awards such as the Guggenheim fellowship. As such,
I.T. 4056, would seem to constitute a reversal of policy in this area.
The courts have not as yet been called upon to appraise the view of the Service
expressed in I.T. 4056. However, it was apparently urged to be controlling in
Ephraim Banks.' 7 In this case, the taxpayer was awarded a research fellowship to
enable him to participate in a project under a contract between the grantor college
and the United States Navy. The appointing letter characterized the award as a
"stipend", and stated that the taxpayer would be expected to devote thirty-five
hours a week to the project, and that he would be entitled to a vacation. It also
suggested that he file a withholding statement with the school bursar. While the
taxpayer used his research experience as the basis for a doctor's dissertation, this
was not considered as controlling in the finding of taxable income as compensation
for services. The Tax Court stated that the indicative factors were: the use of the
term "stipend" as constituting a literary term for "salary" or "compensation";
the vacation provision; the tax withholding suggestion; and the required thirtyfive hours of work each week. It pointed out that the facts presented a stronger
case for taxability than the recently enacted ruling of the Internal Revenue Service

in I.T.4056.
Another factor which might well be considered sufficiently indicative of
compensation for services in fellowship awards is the practice of reserving the
fruits of the research to the grantor. This might consist in simply the right to publish the dissertation where the fellow is a candidate for a degree. In Robert F.
Doerge,18 the Tax Court, in following the Banks decision, noted without comment that any patents resulting from the research would have been controlled by
th'e grantor university. And, as discussed above, a fellowship awarded as a prize
in a formal contest, or flowing to the recipient as a result of an employment relationship, might also form a sufficient basis for taxation.

The Achievement Award
Seemingly, the Commissioner has attempted to reach but a few types of public service awards as taxable income. An early administrative view is G.C.M.5881.1 9
This ruling dealt with an award by a public welfare organization. It was said: "It
appears that the award was made to the taxpayer in recognition of his achievements in science and his services in promoting the public welfare. An award of this
kind made by one to whom no services have been rendered is a gratuity as distinguish'ed from compensation for services. Clearly the award was not a competitive prize ...therefore ... constituted a gift."
While it might be arguable that the "broad sweep" of section 22 (a) is sufficient to characterize such an award as taxable income, the usual criteria of a gift
17 17 T.C.1386 (1952); accord: Robert F. Doerge,
52,140 P-H Memo. T.C.
18 Ibid.
19 VIII-1 C.B. 68 (1929) ; cf. Israel Strauss, 6 T.C.M. 880 (1947).
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seem to be present. It seems to be still the administrative view and is in accord
with the dicta of Mr. Justice Douglas in the Robertson opinion. Presumably it
would apply to such awards as the Nobel prize, noted to be excluded from income
20
in the McDermott opinion, and the Philadelphia Award.
On the borderline, however, might be such awards as the Pulitzer prize, or
similar awards not resulting from a formal contest. An autblr who would submit
a published or unpublished work in a formal literary contest would be, presumably,
in the same position as taxpayer Robertson. 21 Between this situation and that where
a committee selects a published work without formal submission is but a short
step. It is a reasonable certainty that every author is more or less consciously aware
of the fact that his work might be considered for such an award. It is thus arguable
that any award made is responsive to his personal efforts and should be treated as
taxable income. At this point it is also but a short step to treating the Nobel prize
as taxable income. Perhaps this logic is faulty. If not, it is then only because of
some overriding policy that such awards go untaved.
20 See Bok v. McCaughan, 42 F.2d 616 (C.C.A.3d 1930), for features of this award and ruling
that its source was deductible as a charitable contribution.
21 Where a publisher, owning all the literary rights in a published work, submits the work in a
contest where the award is won by the author, it is arguable that under the contract analogy of Mr.
Justice Douglas that the author would be taxable as a third party donee beneficary. But-Whose
income is it? Has the publisher made a gift to the author?

